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Full circle: 
Australian wage determination 1982-1984 
David H. Plowman* 
This article, the third by the author for this journal, follows trends in Australia wage 
[vcing from December 1981 to mid-1984. It deals particulary with the effects of the 
Hawke Labour Government's economic policies as they have affected wage determination 
and attempts to assess possible future developments. 
Two previous articles in this journal outlined the operations of the systems of wage 
indexation which operated in Australia from April 1975 until July 1981 (Plowman 1978, 
1982). These articles examined the changing political and economic context within which 
indexation operated, the 19 different National Wage Cases conducted over the period, the 
increasing pressures placed on centralised wage fixing, the 5 separate sets of guidelines 
which attempted to take account of prevailing circumstances, and the final breakdown of 
the system. The second article also examined the metal industry settlement of December 
1981 which provided the benchmark for award adjustments in 1982. 
This article documents developments in the period following the Metal Industry 
Agreement of December 1981 to the middle of 1984. This brief period of some 2~ years 
witnessed attempts at "decentralisation", the imposition of the only explicit wages freeze 
in Australian federal history, and the return to wage indexation . The first part of this 
paper briefly reviews the system of decentralisation operating in 1982 as well as the May 
1982 National Wage Case in which the ACTU sought a return to centralism. The second 
section examines the wages freeze introduced in December 1982 together with the 
probable reasons for the Coalition Government abandoning its apparent faith in the case by 
case approach to wage determination. The third section documents the new Labor Govern-
ment's economic prices and incomes approach to economic management , the ALP -
ACTU Economic Accord and the National Economic Summit Conference, all of which 
set the scene for a return to centralised wage determination. The penultimate section 
reviews the return of indexation, the guidelines adopted for the period to September 1985, 
and the National Wage Case of April 1984. The final section examines potential future 
developments and possible pressures on the Accord and indexation, and the Liberal Party's 
new wages policy. This section serves to confirm the general conclusion of the previous 
article, namely that "over the long haul, the Australian approach to wage determination 
may come to mirror the political cycle". 
Decentralisation 
The period of so-called decentralisation prevailed from the end of indexation in July 
1981 until the commencement of the wages freeze in December 1982. Wage settlements 
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in this period were influenced by the Metal Industry Agreement of December 1981. The 
implementation of the freeze prevented a renegotiation of this Agreement _and t~us its 
potential as a further pace-setter. The National Wage Case of May 1982, m which the 
ACTU sought to establish the Agreement as a community standard together with a return 
to a centralised system, was the major interlude of the period. 
The National wage case, May 1982 
As noted in the 1978 article the Metal Industry Agreement provided for a $25 per 
week increase at the fitters rate (i.e. 11.9 percent for New South Wales tradesmen), a $14 
mid-term adjustment (5.7 percent), increased supplementary payments, a reduction in 
working hours from 40 to 38 per week, and a "no further claims" clause. In this National 
Wage Case the ACTU sought to establish the terms of this Agreement as a community 
standard. It argued that since the Agreement had been concluded there had emerged a 
movement in wage rates of similar or identical proportions to those of the metal agreement 
and sought an arbitrated follow-on to those employees not already in receipt of this 
standard. In this respect the union claim appeared to differ from other national wage 
claims in which generalised wage increases are sought on the grounds of economic capacity. 
To the extent , however, that the mid-term adjustment did not have general application in 
May 1982, the ACTU claim was effectively one of the $25 "catch-up" (in proportional 
terms) plus a $14 per week wage increase. 
In considering the claims the Commission considered 2 major questions as paramount. 
The first concerned whether or not the Metal Industry Agreement did in fact constitute a 
"community standard". The second consideration was whether or not it should provide 
for a centralised system of wage determination or continue with the "unguided case by 
case approach" requested by both the government and private employers. The government 
argued that its non-accommodative economic policy, particulary tight monetary controls, 
would ensure wage demands were kept in check, particularly once the "learning costs" 
accompanying the movement to the decentralised system had been overcome. 
The case was conducted in the background of economic recession . The Metal Agree-
ment of December 1981 had been concluded in the prevailing "economic boom" environ-
ment. This rapidly gave way to an environment of "economic doom". Whereas metal 
establishments had full order books at the time of the Agreement as well as heightened 
expectations, a sudden and serious downturn resulted in the industry suffering its worst 
recession since the depression of the 1930s. Within a short period the metal unions which 
had successfully negotiated a shorter standard working week were attempting to obtain the 
short-term week to protect job opportunities. The short-term week is one in which both 
hours of work and wages are reduced to accommodate the work in hand. This economic 
downturn may have been the reason for the ACTU's application. Though it was entitled 
to apply for such a case in February , at a time when flow-ons through negotiations were 
more easily achieved , it choose not to do so until April, by which time negotiations were 
more difficult. The economic context necessitated the ACTU presenting arguments 
concerning the capacity of the economic to pay its "catch-up" claims. This it attempted 
by asserting that the Metal Industry Agreement did little more than compensate for price 
increases in the 18 month period from the abandonment of indexation to the expiration 
of the Agreement. For good measure the it added that "known productivity increases 
since 1974/ 75 are accommodated in the catch-up application". 
This latter claim had less merit than may appear the case, notwithstanding the pro-
visions in the indexation guidelines for national wage adjustments on the grounds of 
national productivity and the fact that no such claims were processed. The generalised 4 
percent "work value" wage round of 1978-80 was more in the nature of a productivity 
rather than a work value wage movement (Plowman, 1981, pp.105-7). 
The Confederation of Australian Industry (CAl) had the better of the economic 
argument on this occasion. Its evidence suggested that the labour cost increases resulting 
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from the Metal Agreement amounted to between 20 and 30 percent depending upon the 
base chosen. Increased overtime resulting from the shorter working week could increase 
these estimates by a further 3 percentage points. 
Though it expressed reservations concerning this and other statistical information 
presented, the Bench concluded that there had been large earnings "compared with normal 
national productivity movements (which) may have a delayed adverse effect on profit-
ability, employment and inflation -especially in the context of the non-accommodating 
economic policy of the Commonwealth and the deterioration in Australia's international 
competitive position" (ACAC 1982a, p.ll ). 
The Commission was also cautious concerning the existence of a community standard. 
After dissecting the statistical evidence it concluded that over 80 percent of all award 
employees had received wage increases since the abandonment of indexation. Of these 
between 88 percent and 91 percent (depending upon whether one accepted CAl or ACTU 
calculations) had received increases of $20 or more. Only a third of the ACTU sample, 
however, had received $20 or more as well as the mid-term adjustment. The Bench con-
cluded that "the search for a community standard ... has not been conclusive and we are 
not prepared to recognise the existence of the specific standard sought by the ACTU" 
(p.lS). Such a standard was explicitly recognised 6 months later when the Government 
sought the introduction of the wages freeze. 
The full Bench also refused the ACTU claim for a return to a centralised wages system 
in favour of the existing system supported by the Government. In doing so, however, it 
left the Government in no doubt about its disquiet concerning the approach sought: 
... we are not as sanguine as the Commonwealth about the force of learning experience in 
the present circumstances. We note that despite the Commonwealth's non-accommodating 
economic policy settings which it said "had been in place for some time", the level of wage 
rates has risen sharply in the various settlements which have occured since the abandonment 
of wage indexation; and they have affected a variety of industries, including those which are 
not in a strong competitive position in relation to imports such as clothing, textiles and motor 
vehicles. We note that employers have expressed a contrary view of the efficacy of non-
accommodating economic policy and the monetary bite in restraining the size of wage settle-
ments ... The monetary bite may eventually operate in the labour market but from our 
observations and experience of wage settlements, it could take much longer and inflict greater 
economic and industrial hardship than the Commonwealth appears to assume (p.25). 
Apparently the Government itself came to a similar conclusion. Within 6 nonths of 
the decision being handed down it sought the abandonment of the case by case approach in 
favour of the most centralised wages system ever implemented in Australia - the wages 
freeze. 
The Wages Freeze 
The Metal Industry Agreement was to expire in December 1982. Metal unions drew 
up an ambit log of claims which suggested the potential for a further round of increased 
labour costs for this industry, and for other industries the subject of flow-ons. This claim 
included the full indexing of wage rates at the December 1982 levels, increased supplemen-
tary payments, a 9 day fortnight, the payment of basic health cover of employees by 
employers, an increase in overtime rates and sick leave entitlements, the indexing of tool 
allowances, paid study leave, and an increase in clothing provisions. A reasonabfe assess-
ment at the time was that the unions would have settled for full indexation (Plowman, 
1982, p.201). The MTIA responded by seeking a continuation of the existing agreement 
for a further 6 months, thus resulting in a freezing of wages for lhis period. The Govern-
ment took up this cue, no doubt by now conscious that a new wage round eminating from 
a new agreement may not have been constrained by its "non-accommodating policies" nor 
by the surmounting of "learning costs". In that month it legislated for a 12 month wage 
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freeze for its own employees by way of the Salaries and Wages Pause Act 1982. Under this 
legislation wage tribunals were unable to increase rates of remuneration for public 
employees. At a Premiers' Conference in the same month the Government was able to 
pursuade the states to support such a freeze in relation to their own employees, the carrot 
being that any money thus saved would be given to the states for employment relief 
projects. The Commonwealth estimated this saving to be in the order of $300m over the 
12 month period. 
The Government sought an extension of the freeze to the private sector by way of 
a National Wage Case which concluded on December 23. Generally the states supported 
the Commonwealth in its application for a wages freeze, though 3 (Labour) states sought 
a 6 month rather than 12 month freeze. Private employers also supported the freeze urging 
the Commission to declare that the national economy could not support any increases in 
labour costs. They proposed that a national inquiry be held at the end of the 12 month 
period to determine whether or not the freeze be removed. Not unnaturally the ACTU 
strongly opposed the wage freeze claiming that there was no benefit to either industrial 
relations or to the economy in such a move. It further claimed that a wages freeze which 
was not accompanied by a freeze on prices was inequitous. 
The Commission's assessment was that the wages pause should be extended to the 
private sector. It choose, however, to initiate a freeze for only 6 months and to review 
the situation in June 1983. Further action would be determined on the outcome of this 
review. The Bench determined a set of guidelines for the duration of the freeze which 
noted that: 
a policy of restraint should apply to any proposal for an increase in wages, salaries or al-
lowances, reduction of hours, or improvements in other conditions of employment, whether 
by award, overaward or agreement. The Commission will guard against any contrived arrange-
ment which would circumvent this approach (ACAC 1982b, p.l5). 
In summary form the guidelines provided that: 
(I) There should be no increase in wages and salaries of federal awards. 
(2) Awards which had not received the "metal industry standard" could be varied up to 
this standard. 
(3) Where new processes or method of work were introduced warranting the creation of 
new classifications of employees, new award rates of pay could be established. 
(4) Application being processed in the Commission for the introduction of a 38 hour week 
could proceed under the rules adopted in May 1982. No new applications were to be 
processed. 
It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for the Government's decision to abandon 
the case by case approach in which it had previously placed such great faith. One reason 
may well have been the replacement of Viner by Ian MacPhee as Minister for Industrial 
Relations. The former was a "dry" enarmoured by the virtues of collective bargaining. 
MacPhee is a past member of the "industrial relations club", having been Director of the 
Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers for many years. MacPhee lost little time in voicing 
concern for the system then in operation. 
A more compelling factor in the Government's volte-face may have been political 
expediency. An election was due by November 1983 and economic analysts predicted 
that the economy would deteriorate further by then. The August 1982 budget was gener-
ally regarded as an early election budget . The election was delayed because of the Costigan 
Report which indicated gross irregularities in certain offices of the Taxation Department. 
The wages freeze may well have been designed to bring about union hostility, strike action 
and a "law and order" election. If so, the strategy failed because of poor timing. Fraser 
called the election at a time when industrial action in the petroleum and transport indus-
~ tb period of OpPQSition the ALP developed and refmed its economic policies. 
'!be major thrust of economiC manapment under these policies is one of combattns 
feflatton and unemplO}'J,JleQt simultaneously by way of a prices and incomes strategy. 
fte experience learnt durin& the Wh:itlam period in which there were frequent policy 
ctiferences between the induatrlal and political wings of the labour movement led to the 
WabJielnrumt of a joint AJ..P.o.ACTU body, the Australian Labour Advisory Committee 
~). 1'1le Aeoord waa a major outcome of the deliberatiou of this Committee con-
mating of 3 ACTU members and 3 AlP members. The latter included Hawke the present 
!rime Mlmster, Harden then leader of the Opposition and now a senior Cabinet Minister, 
and Willis who is BOJV Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations. 
The Accord argues the cases for a prices and incomes policy; spells out the nature, 
aa.d defines the elements of, such a policy; and outlines the policy details agreed upon 
between the ALP and the ACTU. Concerning the need for a prices and incomes approach 
tct economic management the Accord notes: 
It il with (tho monetarilt) expedeuce m mhld that both orpuilatioua have 1ee11 fit to try and 
develop a ~ agreed upon policy on prices and mcomes for implemeutation by a Labour 
Gownuneat. Such a poUoy offers by far the best prospects of euabllna Auatralia to ex-
perleoce proloopd hfgher mea of economic and employment growth, and accompanying 
pvwth iD ltYh1l atandardi, without mcurrlng the chcumacribing penfllty of hlgher inflation, 
by ~ tbr resuNoa of~ mcomea claims at IDwer innlltion than would other-
wile a tho -. With: JDiatilqa eoatd be.lalldaievecl iD thlt way, b......, an4 monetary 
J1CdJoilu may be rea11011H1Jr aot to PRUUto ~ and employmtmt growth, thus cmabJiD1 
~ te beacl11ced aa4Jhrjq ~to rile. (ACI'U,1983, p.2). 
'I'M ~ ...,.. polley de1;d1t protide for "'Wage justice" and the ensuring that ''wage fft_. 8!18t lfte eddMt lnJ.petiJs to inflation dr U!lelllployment••. It is agreed that: 
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The agreed upon policy also provides for the establishment of a pricing authority; 
the strengthening of the Trades Practices Act to strengthen and promote effective com-
petition; controls over non-wage incomes including dividends, capital gains, rent, interest, 
directors' fees, and incomes of unincorporated enterprises; restructuring of the income 
tax scale to ease the tax burden on law and middle income earners; measures to smash 
tax avoidance; reduction in regressive indirect taxation; and the development of "suppor-
tive policies" in a range of areas. These include industrial relations legislation, industrial 
development and technological change, immigration, social security, occupational health 
and safety , education, health, and public employment. 
Thus it can be seen that the Accord is an all-embracing document. Of particular 
interest for the purposes of this paper is its support for the centralised system of wage 
determination based upon (full) indexation. 
The National Economic Summit Conference 
Just as the Accord was designed to cement ALP-ACTU relations so the Economic 
Summit , which took place during 11 - 14 April, was designed to project the "consensus" 
approach to business and other community interests . The scene for the Summit was 
largely set by Teasurer Keating who outlined the principal guidelines which would direct 
ALP economic strategy. As might be expected these guidelines closely followed the 
Accord and in some cases where identically worded as the Accord. The thrust of Keating's 
approach was that: 
(1) Without a prices and incomes policy, economic recovery would soon lead to increased 
inflation , thus forcing the Government to adopt contractionary anti-inflationary 
policies which could truncate recovery. 
(2) A prices and incomes policy permitted higher rates of economic growth, without 
incurring the circumscribing penalty of higher unemployment and inflation. 
(3) Within the context of an incomes policy , budgetary and monetary policies could be 
responsibly set with an eye to economic growth. 
( 4) While the prices and incomes policy would allow the Government to stimulate the 
economy and thus reduce unemployment , Government could see no quick solutions 
available for a return to full employment. 
The Treasurer then presented 3 scenarios variously called Scenarios A, B and C, or 
High , Medium and Low Wage Economic Paths respectively. These scenarios were designed 
to promote discussion on the best methods of dealing with prevailing economic circum-
stances . Implicit in the scenarios was the notion that only by controlling wage increases 
could the Government hope to regulate the economy along constructive lines. The 
scenarios , intended to cover the period 1983-86 were: 
(1) Scenario A (Medium wage path) . This scenario assumed a 3 percent pay rise in the 
latter half of 1983 but with no catch-up for the price increases during the freeze. The 
scenario assumed the introduction of full quarterly indexation with provision for 
productivity increases from 1985. 
(2) Scenario B (High wage path) . This assumed that the wages pause would cease in June 
1983 and that full catch-up would be paid for price increases up to that time (approxi-
mately 5.5 percent) . It assumed the introduction of full indexation from August/ 
September 1983 with annual productivity reviews from 1984. 
(3) Scenario C (Low wage path). This scenario assumed the effective extension of the 
wages pause until April 1984 with the last 6 months of this freeze being partially 
offset by half indexation. Partial indexation would take place every 6 months pro-
viding fo r a maximum of 80 percent of price increases being passed onto wage and 
salary earners. Annual productivity reviews would commence in 1985. 
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By introducing these three scenarios the Government effectively shaped the nature 
of the discussion which followed and this set the tenor of the conference. The Treasurer 
elucidated on the economic and industrial relations attributes of each approach leading to 
the conclusion that scenario A was the preferable option. The ACTU concurred with this 
view. 
Unlike the unions which were represented by the ACTU Executive , employers were 
invited to the conference either because of their institutional positions within major 
employer organisations, or because of their company positions and thus appeared in their 
own right. Not unnaturally this made it more difficult to co-ordinate the employer view-
point. The CAl, which could have been expected to perform a leadership role , found itself 
in conflict with many of the employers present. It is reasonable to assume that those 
invited in their own right were overcome by the occasion and were prone to making con-
cessional statements in. relation to wages and employment conditions, which the more 
professional and expert negotiators from the Confederation had to diffuse. This gave the 
CAl the image of being the only group not prepared to make concessions in the national 
interest. In view of the apparent, rather than real, nature of the union concessions this was 
not the case. Euphoria, however , rather than balanced judgement, became an important 
part of the Summit atmosphere. 
For all the hostility engendered against it , the CAl scored a major success in restrain-
ing the joint statement presented by employers which was arrived at after several hours of 
consideration in camera. In this they resolved to oppose any return to the use of the 
consumer price movements as the basis for adjusting wages, notwithstanding claims by the 
ACTU that such a policy could only result in bitter industrial disputation. However , no 
doubt disenchanted with the results of the so-called decentralised wages system which 
operated in the post indexation period, employers did agree that it was appropriate to 
return to a centralised system of wage determination . This meant that all major parties 
at the conference where in agreement that a centralised system of wage determination 
was desirable . 
Though a useful forum for demonstrating the goodwill of the new Government to-
wards the corporate sector and as a public relations exercise , few of the areas agreed upon 
in the final Summit Communique afforded sufficient detail to provide a blue print for 
future action . Thus, in the area of wages the Communique notes : 
The Summit stresses that the Conference was never intended as a forum to negotiate the 
timing or quatum of wage increases. It is accepted that this is a matter for the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 
All parties believe that the principles of wage ftxation should be to provide wage justice 
to employees whilst seeking to ensure that wage increases do not give added impetus to 
inflation or unemployment. 
It is believed that a centralized approach to wage ftxation is the most equitable means 
by which the objectives can be met. It is recognised that if a centralized system is to work 
effectively as the only way in which wage increases are generated, a suppression of sectional 
claims is essential except in special or extraordinary circumstances proved before the cen-
tralized wage ftxing authority. 
Th_is summit therefore proposes that the parties should as a matter of priority develop 
the optwn of a return to a centralized system under the auspices of the Australian Concilia-
tion and Arbritration Commission . 
. The thrust of ~he.se ~esolutions is that of a high degree of unanimity concerning wages 
pohcy. Such unanumty 1s more apparent than real. While there is general agreement con-
cerning the desirability of a centralised wage fixing system, there is no indication as to the 
nature and rules regulating that system. This has been placed in the "too hard" basket and 
left for the Commission to determine - a situation very little different from that prevailing 
before the Summit Conference was called. 
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The return of indexation 
In view of the election of Labour to office and the Accord, is it not surprlliD& dJ.at 
ACTU would seek a return of wage indexation. In June 1983, when the waps ft.,.. caaw 
up for review, the union movement pressed for the introduction of wage indexatioa amf 
for wage increases of 4.3 percent to compensate for price movements in the March an4 
June quarters of 1983. Indicating the changed political climate the ACTU was supported 
by all mainland governments with the exception of Queensland and the Northern 
Territory. Tasmania also opposed the claims. 
The CAl, while supporting a return to centralised wage fiXing, opposed a centralised 
system based upon price movements and further claimed that such a system ought not be 
introduced until the end of 1983. 
In reaching its determination, the Commission noted the 3 significant developments 
which had taken place since the introduction of the freeze. These included the Accord and 
National Economic Summit Conference already described and which both supported a 
centralised system of wage determination, and the President's Conference following the 
Summit Conference. In response to requests from the ACTU and CAl arising from para-
graph 22 of the Communique cited above, the President chaired a 4 day conference of the 
major national wage parties. This conference attempted to determine those areas of 
agreement and disagreement concerning a wage fiXing system. A subsequent Report 
itemised 23 issues dealt with and summarised the outcome on each of these issues. As with 
the Summit Conference, the parties agreed on the desirability of a centralised system but 
could not agree upon how such a system ought to operate. Consensus was reached, 
however, by the CAl, ACTU and Commonwealth in 17 areas (ACAC, 1983a, p.ll). 
Though, in the final analysis the Commission still had to determine the form of centralised 
system to be introduced, this degree of consensus in a large range of areas did make its task 
easier. These factors, together with the Government's prices and incomes policy and 
assurances from the ACTU in relation to "non-conformists" pursuaded the Commission 
"that it would be in the public interest ... to try once again to operate a centralized 
system based upon prima facie full indexation ... in the expectation that it would lead to 
a more stable industrial environment and that it would provide the basis for a more rapid 
economic recovery than would occur in any alternative system" (p.16). On September 
23, nearly 3 months after the case opened, the Commission granted the wage increases 
sought by the ACTU and instituted a new set of indexation guidelines. These are outlined 
below. 
The indexation principles 
National wage adjustments 
The principles provided for bi-annual wage adjustments on account of movements 
in the 8 Capitals Consumer Price Index (Darwin and Canberra having been ·added to the 
previous 6 Capitals CPI). The Commission will normally sit in the months of February and 
August following the publication of the CPI figures for the months of June and December 
respectively. The form of indexation will be uniform percentage indexation "unless the 
Commission decides otherwise in the light of exceptional circumstances". No provision 
is made for the automatic indexation of overaward payments but Principle l(d) provides 
that it would be appropriate "for the Commission, after hearing the parties to an award 
and being satisfied that a proper case has been made out" to recommend overaward in-
dexation. There are to be no wage claims on account of national productivity increases 
until 1985. 
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Commitment to the principles 
To benefit from national wage cases unions must give an undertaking to abide by the 
e Principles. Where unions do not given such an undertaking their relevant awards are not 
tl to be indexed. 
Work value changes 
As with previous indexation guidelines the Mark VI version provide for wage increases 
(in addition to those granted to compensate of CPI movements) on account of changes 
in work value. Principle 4(a) defines these as changes arising from "changes in the nature 
of the work, skill and responsibility required or the conditions under which work is per-
formed" . This Principle notes that "changes in work by themselves may not lead to a 
change in wage rates. The strict test for an alteration in wage rates is that the change in 
the nature of work should constitute such a significant net addition to work requirements 
as to warrant the creation of a new classification". This addition to the Principle 4(a) is 
no doubt intended to lessen the possibility of a "work value" wage round similar to that 
which occured in 1978-80. Further restriction to this Principle designed to ensure that it 
does not become the vehicle of generalised wage movements include : 
(1) Wage increases on account of work value may only be applied to employees who have 
been reclassified or , where reclassified is not appropriate , preferably by way of changes 
in award allowances. 
(2) The datum point for measuring changes in work value may not pre-date January 1, 
1978. 
(3) Comparative wage justice is to play a limited role in such exercises. It may not be 
used in itself to demonstrate the need for wage adjustments . Once work value changes 
have been identified, however, comparative wage justice may be used to indicate the 
monetary adjustments which might be appropriate. 
(4) Members of the Commission are warned against contrived classifications and over-
classifications. 
(5) Where, because of technological or other changes, the impact of work value on the 
workforce is widespread or general , the matter is to be pursued as a productivity 
rather than work value case. 
Standard hours of work 
Because of the general movement from the 40 standard hour working week which 
followed the Metal Industry Agreement of December 1981 and which was still being 
pr?cessed through the Commission, the Full Bench considered it necessary to give some 
guidance as to the handling of such cases within the indexation framework. The guide-
lines provide that : 
(1) Opposed claims are to be rejected; 
(2) ~gree~~nts and ~nopposed cl~ims are to be scrutinised to ensure that the cost impact 
1s negligible. Umons are requued to offer cost offsets to the implementation of a 38 
hour standard week; 
(3) Claims below 38 hours, even if accompanied by full cost offsets, are not to be allowed; 
(4) ~roductivity bargaining is not to be the basis of reduced working hours or other award 
improvements. 
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Anomalies and inequities 
Where special and extraordinary circumstances exist these are to be resolved by 
anomalies conferences to be heard by Full Benches. These should safeguard against relying 
on comparative wage justice. The same procedure should apply to inequities , situations 
"where employees performing similar work are paid similar rates of pay without good 
reason": 
Paid rates awards 
Paid rates awards are those in which the former overaward component has been 
brought into the award. Under an indexation regime this means that the previous 
overaward component is indexed . This creates the potential for discontent as employees 
on minimum rates awards compare their lot with those under paid rates awards. Principle 
7 attempts to provide some guidance in this area which complements the guidance in 
relation to the adjustment of overaward payments. In general, members of the 
Commission are to refrain from making any new paid rates awards. Claims for the adjust-
ment of existing paid rates awards " to establish an equitable base" are to be processed 
as anomalies. 
Allowances 
The guidelines provide for the periodic adjustment of existing allowances "which 
constitute a reimbursement of expenses incurred". New allowances may only be awarded 
to compensate those expenses not already reimbursed. 
The National Wage Case, April1984 
This was the first national wage case to be held following the introduction of the new 
indexation guidelines in September 1983. Hearings in respect to wage increases on account 
of the Consumer Price Index movements for the September and December 1983 quarters 
began on February 28th and , after 9 sitting days (a short period by national wage 
standards) concluded on March 16th. The Full Bench handed down its decision on April 
4th. The September 1983 and December 1983 quarters CPI had increased by 1.6 percent 
and 2.4 percent respectively, and the ACTU argued for full indexation for the compounded 
increase of 4.1 percent. In this it was supported by the Commonwealth, all the state Labour 
Governments (I.e. Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales). It 
was opposed by the CAl on behalf of private employers generally, the state of Tasmania, 
the Northern Territory and several employer bodies which have imputed that the CAl has 
not been sufficiently forceful in opposing indexation. These represented the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce, mining interests and farming interests. The state of Queensland 
opposed full indexation . It favoured plateau indexation based on $256 per week, this 
figure being the average weekly award rate for January 1984. Implicit in the Queensland 
submission was that salaries above the suggested threshold should be compressed, an area in 
which the Commission came to grief in 1976 and 1977. 
Private employers stressed the fragility of the economy, the devasting impact wage 
increases could have on the embryonic recovery, the inflationary and unemployment 
effects of such increases and the lag in private investment, a portent of future problems. 
The mining industry presented a gloomy picture of that sector with depressed world prices, 
severe international competition and no expectation of any "substantial" pick-up in profits 
before 1985. Farming interests argued that an "exceptionally good season" was necessary 
to remove the "drought legacy of debts and restocking". 
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Supporters of full indexation adjuced many indicators to suggest economic recovery 
was well under way. Unemployment had fallen from 10.3 percent in June 1984 to 9.4 
percent in February 1984 and over the same period civilian employment had risen by 
1.8 percent. Advertised job vacancies had risen as had real private consumption. Interest 
rates continued to fall, the profit share had risen and both Farm and Non-Farm Gross 
Domestic Product grew strongly. 
The Full Bench concluded that the material before it "made it clear that although 
there had been a recovery, although this recovery had been somewhat faster than was 
anticipated 6 months ago and although investment expectations have been revised up-
wards, the recovery is still in its infancy" (ACAC, 1984, p.7). On economic and other 
grounds, however, the Bench felt that full indexation was justified. Concerning the de-
pressed mining and rural industries the Bench noted that: 
it should be understood that, this being a national wage case, (specific industry material) is 
only relevant in so far as it throws light on the overall state of the economy. Economic 
incapacity in relation to particulary industries is a matter for consideration in relation to 
particular award adjustments (p.8). 
This remark may well have been directed to the futility of sectional employer groups 
fragmenting the CAl (as the rural sector has done) in the expectation of getting for their 
members better results at national wage cases. The Bench has reminded such groups that 
the appropriate time to argue the case for the inability of a particular industry to pay 
national wage increases is when individual awards are varied in line with national wage 
adjustments. This provision was specifically provided for in the September 1983 decision 
in which the Bench noted: 
While we would not debar argument being advanced on economic incapacity we would em-
phasize not only the long established principle of wage fixation that those seeking to argue 
incapacity to pay must present a strong case, but also that the fundamental basis of a cen-
tralized system is uniformity and consistency of treatment. In particular in cases involving 
the adjustment of rates in line with national wage decisions the Commission should not refuse 
an increase except in extreme circumstances (ACAC, 1983, p.19). 
A second reason for which employers argued that indexation should not be granted 
related to lack of commitment to the principles. Such argumentation concerning the lack 
of "substantial compliance" formed an important part of the previous indexation regime . 
Of particular interest were developments in the construction industry in which unions had 
transformed a $9 above indexation claim into one for the introduction of superannuation 
in the industry. The ACTU rejected this contention. The claim was isolated to 1 industry 
and sought to remove a situation where a particular group of employees were not entitled 
to an employment benefit generally available to other employees. Of more importance 
was the situation in the food preserving and confectionary industries in which the unions 
had refused to give the appropriate undertaking required by the guidelines. In several 
instances employers had granted the appropriate wage increases after assurances from their 
own employees that they would abide by the guidelines. Such wage increases could not 
receive the Commission's consent and so could not be incorporated into awards. The CAl 
requested that in such circumstances the Commission should vary awards in relation to 
specific establishments where it was satisfied that the undertaking given by the employees 
was genuine. "It is regrettable", the Bench commented, 
that the unions concerned did not see fit to give their members award protection by declaring 
their commitment to the Principles as required in the spirit of the Accord to which they are 
party. But ... the provision sought by the CAl would allow a piecemeal application of 
national wage increases in a way which could undermine the responsibility of particular 
unions and of the ACTU in ensuring that the Principles are adhered to. Moreover, we should 
not do anything to weaken the longstanding convention that the Commission should deal 
with unions rather than individual employees. (ACAC, 1984, - p.14). 
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As already noted the Queensland submission sought plateau indexation. This received 
little support from the Commission which, on the basis of previous experience, had pro-
vided under Principle 1(c) for uniform percentage adjustments unless exceptional circum-
stances existed. It has also been noted that the September 1983 Principles indicated that 
full indexation would be the norm. In this case the CAl made a lengthy submission argu-
ing for the discounting of Government charges and tax induced CPI increases. In rejecting 
this the Bench reaffirmed its commitment to full indexation. "The adoption of the CAl's 
reasoning on this question", it claimed, "could well lead to partial indexation on a regular 
basis, an approach which would be inconsistent with the concept underlying the present 
indexation package". For good measure it added: "Further, we believe that to interfere 
with the CPI by way of discounting, even if justified on economic logic, may reduce con-
fidence in the present system and weaken commitment to it" (p. 12). 
In granting full indexation on this occasion there is little doubt that the Full Bench 
was as much motivated by the Accord as it had been when implementing the September 
1983 Principles. The arguments before it , the Bench claimed, "are essentially similar to 
those facing the Commission in its deliberations leading to its decision of 23 September 
1983" (p.1 0). It added that it was "moved by the same considerations" as in the earlier 
case (p.11). These considerations included the Government prices and incomes policy 
"described as the corner-stone of economic policy"; the Accord, regarded as "a major 
anti-inflationary instrument" by the Treasurer; the endorsment of "an effective prices and 
incomes policy" and a centralized system of wage determination in the Summit 
Communique; and the fact that the package had been formulated for a period of 2 years 
and should be given a fair run during that period. 
Full indexation was granted with the pay increases to become effective from the first 
pay period to commence on or after April 6th 1984. 
The future 
The Accord has now been in operation for 15 months. Despite frequent media 
pontification concerning its near demise it has displayed that degree of stability, and 
elicited sufficient commitment, to suggest that it will continue to be the major vehicle for 
economic and industrial relations policy at least until the expiration of the present 2 year 
indexation package (i.e. until September 1985). Though indexation can survive without 
the Accord, such a survival is likely to become a replay of the 1976-1981 period when, 
stripped of the supporting mechanisms, the indexation framework came to resemble a 
Tower of Babel. In the light of previous experience it is unlikely that the Commission will 
persevere with such a demanding set of Principles in the absence of demonstrated support 
from the incumbent government. 
At the time of writing the Accord has not only confounded the critics who saw in it 
little more than an election ploy but has demonstrated its effectiveness. Unions have not 
broken the undertakings demanded of them by the Principles and the one major recal-
citrant union - the BLF - has been forced by the ACTU and other building industry 
unions to give up its demands for payments of $9 per week in excess of the 4.1 percent 
increase awarded in April. Other building unions were forced to abandon a similar claim 
when the Commission refused to ratify an agreement to that effect which they had 
concluded with the major construction employer associations. Further, indexation and the 
Accord have been accompanied by, or have induced, the lowest level of strikes in 16 years. 
Avoidance of industrial disputation was a major component of the "substantial 
compliance" requirement under the previous indexation regime. In addition the Govern-
ment has successfully introduced Medicare. In so doing it has forced Queensland to back 
away from its threatened boycott; private practitioners under contract to public hospitals 
to give up their alleged right of control over such contracts; and the AMA to accept the 
decisions of the Medical Benefits Tribunal this helping satisfy part of the Accord require-
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ment of controls over non-wage and salary forms of income. The Government has also 
successfully brought the decisions of the Remuneration Tribunal into line with those of 
the Commission, thus removing a major grievance which operated under the previous index-
ation system, where the Government argued before the Commission that the economy 
could not afford full indexation for wage and salary earners, but also argued before the 
Remuneration Tribunal for full , (and in many cases above , CPI increases) for federal 
politicians. The Government has also brought pressure to bear on the South Australian 
and Tasmanian Legislatures which have received abnormally large salary increases since the 
March 1983 elections. 
The Government's approach has been aided by the improved communication channels 
with ACTU by way of the Australian Labour Advisory Committee and by the affinity of 
outlook between Hawke and key figures in the ACTU. The enlargement of the ACTU 
Executive as the result of structural changes following the absorption of the former white 
collar union peak council (the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations) 
and the intended absorption of the Council of Australian Government Employee Organisa-
tions has meant that the majority of key unions are now represented on that Executive . 
Thus they are more amendable to peer group pressure and more likely to be supportive of 
those policies in which they have had an input. In respect to both the Accord and indexa-
tion , the ALP and ACTU have been assisted by the general support of unions ranging the 
ideological spectrum represented within the ACTU. Indexation has also been assisted by 
the requirement that individual unions give an undertaking to adhere to the Principles and 
thus forcing would-be delinquents to face the ACTU opprobrium.' In addition to 
Medicare , other supportive measures which the Government has put into train has also 
helped induce union support. These include the establishment of the Prices Surveillance 
Authority whose real effect might by pyschological rather than instrumental ; the lowering 
of the migration ceiling to 80,000 per year , including a halving of the intake of the 
previous level of " skilled" labour and those on working holidays ; the repealing of the 
CEEP Act which provided for the compulsory retrenchment of certain classes of public 
employees and the amendment of the CERR Act which previously provided for " manage-
ment initiated" retirement of public employees. Economic recovery has also assisted by 
reducing the number of dependent upon unemployment benefits and increasing the 
number of employees contributing to the taxation coffers. This will make it easier for the 
Government to provide taxation concessions which form an integral part of the Accord . 
Most importantly the Accord has been aided by the high level of trust between the union 
movement and the Government, a situation which contrasts starkly with relationships 
under the Fraser Government. The greater assurity of full indexation provided by the 
existing guidelines has also been of value as has the effective locking-in of employer 
organisations into the indexation regime. 
Another factor aiding the existing indexation system is the high proportion of the 
members of the Commission with little experience in their roles as conciliators and 
arbitrators other than under an indexation regime. Thus the sorts of challenges which 
came from the members of the Commission in the 1975-1981 period are not likely to be 
replicated. Further, changes to the Act in 1979 have removed the ability of Commissions 
to move outside the indexation framework2 while a mechanism has been established to 
quarantine more independently minded presidential members .3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The Food Preservers Union which attempted to justify its breach of the Accord at the 1983 
ACTU Congress was severely criticised by both left wing and right wing unions at this Congress. 
~efore varying awards Commissioners are now required to "consult" with the Deputy President 
m charge of the relevant Panel. 
!"he number of Deputy Presidents now exceeds the number of Industry Panels. This has resulted 
m one Deputy President being consigned exclusively to Full Bench matters. 
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Helpful as these factors may have been during the initiation and infancy stages of 
indexation they do not assure longevity to the Accord or the Principles. In fact each of the 
factors may prove to be potential sources of assistance and pressure. It may be useful to 
look at the possible pressures in terms of the short term, the medium term and the long 
term. 
The short term 
By the short term is meant the period until the expiration of the existing Principles, 
that is until September 1985. By then it is likely that an early federal election will not 
have been held and the ALP confirmed in office for a further 3 years. 
Some of the short term potential pressures eminate from the Principles themselves. 
These, for example, require unions to give an undertaking that they will uphold the Prin-
ciples. Two potential threats are apparent in this respect. The first concerns the way in 
which the Commission might deal with unions which give the undertaking but which also 
indulge in activities inconsistent with the guidelines. Presumably the response would be to 
refuse to vary the appropriate awards following the subsequent national wage case. As 
such unions are likely to have the muscle to win in the field what they have been denied in 
the Commission, such a sanction is not likely to be effective and would merely highlight 
the Commission's lack of enforcement powers. Indexation thus continues to exist on the 
basis of fragile union consensus. 
The second threat relates to unions' refusing to give the necessary undertaking. To 
date only 2 small and insignificant unions in the food preserving and confectionery 
industries have refused to give the undertakings required by the Principles. Their awards 
have not been indexed. The system had coped adequately with this situation. A more 
difficult situation would be presented if major intra-industry unions (such as, for example, 
those covering metal workers or transport workers) were to refuse to give the necessary 
undertaking. In such a situation it would be difficult to see how indexation could survive 
in its present form. An even more problematic situation would be one in which any 1 
union party to a consolidated award refused to give the undertaking. For example, there 
are 8 union respondents to the Metal Industry Award. Should any one of these unions not 
give the undertaking, then all employees under that award would be denied wage 
indexation. Thus a small union, with a relatively insignificant membership under this 
award such as the Gasfitters' and Plumbers' Union, is in a position where it can veto the 
indexation of wages for over 300,000 employees. In this and similar situations a small, 
anti-Accord or anti-indexation union has the potential to bring about a crisis which may 
destroy the system. 
A further potential source of difficulty arising from the guildelines is that individual 
industries are entitled to oppose award variations in line with national wage adjustments 
on the grounds of incapacity to pay. The economic logic behind such a contingency is 
indisputable. The industrial relations implications of select groups such as shearers or 
miners being denied national wage increases on the grounds of a lack of industry capacity 
to pay are disquieting. As noted earlier in this paper, some employer groups, notably the 
National Farmers' Federation, the Australian Mining Industry Council and the Australian 
Chambers of Commerce have taken a harder line to indexation than they have perceived 
to be the case with the CAl. The National Farmers' Federation has disafftliated from the 
CAl and , as with the other organisations, was separately represented at the last National 
Wage Case. It is thus most likely that these bodies will vigorously oppose national wage 
increases to those awards coming under their sphere of influence. 
A major short term problem relates to the "tax bite" which reduces the effective-
ness of indexation in maintaining real standards of living. Because indexation has also 
pushed increased earnings by many beyond the 30 percent taxation bracket and into the 
46 percent bracket, indexation has also been an effective method of reducing real dis-
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posable income without explicit action on the part of the Government. The 4.1 percent 
wage increase awarded in Aprill984, for example , placed an estimated additional 210 ,000 
employees, or an additional 3.4 percent of the workforce, into the 46 percent bracket. 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 9/4/84, p.l7). 
Allied to the taxation problem is that arising from the "~octoring" of the CPI ~s the 
result of the introduction of Medicare. This form of medical msurance has resulted m a 1 
percent levy on personal income tax for "basic" medical public hospital care. Those seek-
ing cover against other health costs have had to take out further private insurance costing 
about $16 per week in the case of family cover. Because basic health insurance is now 
Treasury financed, the medical component has been omitted from the CPI for indexation 
purposes. The net effect is that although workers are still paying for health services either 
by way of the income tax levy and/or private health insurance , this cost component will 
not be compensated for in future national wage cases. An even more immediate problem 
will be that the removal of the health component from the CPI may result in a CPI increase 
of less than 1 percent for the first half of 1984. Consistent with earlier practice, the 
Commission may decide not to hold the National Wage Case scheduled for August under 
such circumstances, thus resulting in an effective wages pause of 12 months (i.e. from 
April 1984 when the last National Wage Case concluded to April 1985 when the National 
Wage Case for the September 1984 and December 1984 quarters will have been processed). 
It is unlikely that unions will sit by idly in such a situation and already the portents are 
that they will use this period as a " catch-up" one to press for compensation for the 9.1 
percent real wage reduction experienced during the wages freeze/pause . Eighteen left 
wing unions have already made demands for a "catch-up" claim in the order of 3.1 percent. 
This claim will be put to the Wages Policy Committee of the ACTU in late May when this 
Committee is due to confer with the Government over taxation. 
Some have hailed this move as a breach of the Accord. Whether or not it proves to 
be so depends upon the way in which such "catch-up" is pursued. The Accord specifically 
provides for the restoration of the foregone 9.1 percent "over time" . Should the 18 unions 
resort to unilateral action in pursuit of their claim then the Accord will have been 
breached. Other methods of achieving the "catch-up" , for example under the productivity 
provisions of the Principles (which would require waiting until at least September 1985) 
or by way of tax concessions, would not be inimical to the Accord or indexation. The 
fact that the 18 unions concerned have taken their claim to the ACTU in time for that 
body to take the matter to Government indicates that those unions are not prepared , at 
least at this point in time, to jettison indexation. 
The Accord has shifted much of the attention over wages to Union-Government 
relations as opposed to Union-Employer relations. This is as it ought to be . Employers 
(and the Commission) may have some influence in relation to the real wage but have little 
control over real disposable income or the "social" wage. Elsewhere I have attempted to 
demonstrate the futility of unions pressing for the indexation of wages under a system 
where the Government is in a position to frustrate union aspirations. In the period March 
1975 to June 1982, for example, the Carpenter and Joiner Classification under the National 
Building Trades Construction Award (a classification which in 1982 approximated the 
A WE figure) received wage increases in the order of $184 per week. Over the same period 
wage imposts in the form of direct and indirect taxation exceeded $210 per week 
(Plowman, 1983 p.423). Thus the existing situation in which unions and governments are 
bartering over real disposal incomes may be a more productive one for unions. Already 
the ACTU and the Government have fired their opening salvos which some journalists have 
interpreted as (yet another) breakdown of the Accord. A more reasonable interpretation 
is that both parties have established some form of "ambit". The ACTU Wages Policy 
Committee has announced its "long term taxation expectations". These include a broadly-
based wealth tax; a capital gains tax; a "review of the system so that taxes do not 
automatically rise with inflation"; a broadening of the tax base; and a tax on "excessive 
profits where appr~priate" (Australian 24/4/84:3). For his part the Minister for Employ-
ment and Industnal Relations has publicly voiced concern that tax cuts could be 
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threatened if any wage claims are made before the budget is finalised. Fortuitously the 
budget is usually announced in the month of August , the month the next national wage 
case is due . 
Though there is an element of ambit negotiations in these exchanges problems on the 
taxation front can be expected. In the short term the major problem will relate to the 
level of taxation relief. To satisfy the ACTU and to foreclose on "catch-up" demands 
in August, the Government will need to make good the "tax bite" out of the indexation 
decisions since September 1983 (i.e. "full tax indexation") as well as make some 
compensation for the CPI discounting as the result of health insurance changes. Unions 
have been quick to point out the price of vegetables are no lower as the result of the 
artificial deflation of the CPI. For the "average" weekly wage earner full tax indexation 
will represent tax cuts in the order of about $10 per week. The Government may also be 
forced to raise the 46 percent marginal taxation threshold from the existing figure of 
$19,500 to remove the increased marginal rate of taxation on middle income earners 
accompanying indexation. In addition some formula will also have to be agreed upon to 
compensate for the estimated 2.8 percent discounting of the CPI as the result of Medicare . 
Whether or not the Government is prepared to give tax concessions of this magnitude 
remains to be seen. A related problem is whether or not unions will accept tax cuts as a 
substitute for the real wage losses under the wage freeze and so discount their 9.1 percent 
catch-up claim. Though there is no logic for not accepting such an exchange, the 
symbolism enshrined in real wage maintenance may prove too strong for some unions and 
highlights yet another longer term potential difficulty. Though tax concessions may be 
good for "keeping the peace" they (and indexation itself) do little to promote union 
officials' image of front line wage fighters. Further tax cuts may enhance the election 
prospects of Governments but do little to enhance the prospects of union officials who 
must also face their constituencies. In the longer term union officials may feel compelled 
to move into new areas of activity to counteract the impression that wage improvements 
are merely by way of Government and Commission fiat. Such excursions may threaten 
the Accord. A similar situation may arise from state industrial tribunals attempting to 
assert their autonomy in relation to the wages of state award employees. 
In the short term one may also expect increasing strains resulting from the all-embrac-
ing nature of the Accord. Unions will feel (and have already suggested) that the Accord 
effectively binds the Government to ACTU policy and gives them a veto over Government 
activities. The AMFSU, for example, has claimed that the Government's intention to 
deregulate banking is in breach of the Accord , ostensibly because meaningful negotiations 
have not been entered into with unions over the issue. No Government can afford to be 
so circumscribed, particularly when "meaningful negotiations" are interpreted to mean 
that unions get their own way. The mining or uranium will provide another area of con-
flict as may the question of immigration . 
The medium term 
By the medium term I mean the period to the end of 1987. During this period the pres-
sures already outlined may be expected to have increased in intensity. Further, if analysts 
are correct in their assessment of the economic situation, by then unions as a whole may be 
provided with a real alternative to wage indexation which, good as it may be in maintaining 
real wages, does little to improve those wages. Contrary to some analysts I do not predict 
that improved economic conditions will automatically result in a "movement away from 
arbitration" as occurred in the mid 1960s. If such a movement is to occur, the economic 
conditions will provide a necessary but insufficient condition for such a movement. The 
most compelling factors will be whether or not the union-government trust relationship 
holds out and whether or not the centralised system is seen to be providing a fair return 
to labour. In such a context full indexation will not be sufficient and will have to be 
augmented by wage increases on account of national productivity movements. The Mark 
VII Principles will need to provide for such a contingency. 
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The period may also see increasing problems as the result of some awards being paid 
rates awards and other minimum rates awards. The guidelines do not offer any long-term 
solution to this problem and perceived relativity erosion on the part of employees on 
minimum rates awards can be expected to intensify. 
The long term 
Beyond 1987 the pressures alluded to in earlier time periods can be expected to have 
increased. By then too, the original visions and intentions of the Accord partners may have 
become blurred by the efflux of time. (Alternatively , of course, a successful partnership 
may result in a greater willingness to pursue the prices and incomes strategy underlying the 
Accord). The Accord may also have become dulled by the cummulative weight of those 
"exogenous" factors which journalists continually find as threatening to the Accord. 
Current "exogenous" factors may help illustrate this point. It is to be expected, for 
example, that redundancy problems on the waterfront , where some 800 jobs are to be shed 
in the first half of 1984, and where those being retrenched are confronted with a lottery 
involving 3 different methods of computing redundancy payments , will be accompanied by 
disputation. It also is to be expected that building and other workers who do not have 
access to superannuation will press for this generally available condition of employment. 
It is also to be expected that the vagaries of the dual system of federal and state tribunals 
will lead to glaring anomalies such as in the electricity generating industry in New South 
Wales where supervising engineers under federal awards are paid less than those state award 
employees they supervise. In situations where employers refuses to acknowledge the 
existence of such anomalies, disputes are inevitable. These, and similar situations, will 
continue to occur and require amelioration irrespective of the existence of the Accord or 
indexation. A danger exists that the Accord may become the victim of self-fulfilling 
prophecy as such activities are seen as evidence of a breakdown . Further , the Accord may 
disintegrate because of the unrealistic expectations placed on it . Such observations, 
however, may underestimate the Accord's resilience. 
The medium and long terms may be expected to be periods in which opposing political 
approaches will be heightened as was the case preceeding the 1983 elections . Though the 
ALP has built its economic policy around centralised wage fiXing and an incomes policy 
approach , it would be wrong to think that should the Accord fall apart the Labour Govern-
ment will be left with no arrows in its quiver. Such an assessment would under-rate the 
Government's pragmatism and instinct for survival. Both Hawke and the former ALP 
leader (Hayden) have warned that in the absence of union co-operation a Labour Govern-
Il!ent would employ the "blunt unselective economic tool of monetary and fiscal policy" 
(Cupper, 1982, p.126). 
Confronting the Labour approach will be the alternative presented by the Liberal 
Party's newly adopted Policy on Industrial Relations. This policy seeks a "system of 
dispute settlement and wage fixing which is sensitive to economic conditions" (p.3). To 
achieve this a "radical but realistic overhaul of the system from within, involving the 
creation of a new tribunal with the power to fix minimum wages, settle disputes, enforce 
decisions, and assist positively in the restructuring of the trade union movement" is pro-
posed. The new tribunal would not have the power to make paid rates awards; wages 
would not be adjusted to prices but rather to productivity; and the only other 
circumstance in which award wages would be varied would be in the case "of a 
demonstrable change in the work value of a particular job" (p.4) . The tribunal would not 
be able to "make an award granting annual leave loading, allowances such as site allowance, 
or superannuation" (p.S). In short, the tribunal would establish only minimum standards 
forcing the parties to enter into "collective bargaining" over other matters. 
This is not the place to debate the merits or demerits of the Liberal Party's policy. 
As with the implementation of the Accord, in the final analysis it will be the electors who 
will decide whether or not the Coalition will have the opportunity of implementing its 
new policy which would appear to be an electoral liability. 
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